Abstract -An important factor driving energy policy over the past two decades has been the ''energy paradox,'' the perception that consumers apply unreasonably high hurdle rates to energy-saving investments. We explore one possible explanation for this apparent puzzle: that realized returns fall short of the returns promised by engineers and product manufacturers. Using a unique data set, we find that the realized return to attic insulation is statistically significant, but the median estimate (9.7%) is almost identical to a discount rate for this investment implied by a CAPM analysis. We conclude that the case for the energy paradox is weaker than has previously been believed.
I. Introduction
H OMEOWNERS have available to them a wide variety of energy-saving home improvements, many of which can (according to engineering estimates) pay for themselves in a very short time period. One of the main puzzles facing policymakers over the past two decades has been the persistent observation that home owners appear to apply very high discount rates to these investment opportunities (Hausman, 1979) . What we have elsewhere dubbed the energy paradox-the apparent use of extremely high discount rates for home improvement investments-can perhaps be explained by drawing on insights from the literature on irreversible investment. (We develop this argument in Hassett and Metcalf (1994) ; see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an excellent overview of this literature.) If energyconservation investments have low salvage value and their return is risky, then optimal investment hurdle rates can exceed the underlying discount rate by a substantial margin. (Metcalf and Rosenthal (1995) apply the Hassett and Metcalf (1994) approach to energy-efficient lighting and refrigerators.)
In this paper, we explore an alternative hypothesis: namely, we investigate whether discount rates in past studies were overestimated because returns to energy-saving investments were overestimated. When past researchers have estimated consumer discount rates, they have used the engineering rates of return as a key input. If an optimizing person who is not liquidity-constrained refused to invest in a project with a 20% rate of return, for example, then we can infer that the hurdle rate for this type of investment is bounded below by 20%. One possible explanation for the high estimated discount rates in past studies is that consumers do not expect to receive anything like the engineering return if they were to adopt the home improvement. This might be the case if, for example, engineering estimates of potential energy savings-which are often provided by the manufacturer of the relevant product-misrepresent savings because they are based on highly controlled studies that do not directly apply to actual realized savings in a representative house.
We analyze whether realized returns are comparable to technical return estimates using the RECS (Residential Energy Consumption Survey) conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy. The RECS survey carefully records household investment in many different energy-conserving devices for a cross-section of households. In addition, the survey collects monthly energy bill data to monitor energy consumption.
For this study, we focus on the returns to attic insulation. We chose to do this because attic insulation is measured very well in our data, and the potential benefits to it are very large. For example, Blasnik (1990) reports that the returns can easily be on the order of 50% per year. These returns are large enough that one would expect any reasonable methodology to detect them.
We find support for the view that realized returns are smaller than has been suggested by past research, with our median estimate for the return to attic insulation being 9.7%. Such a return is consistent with the return implied by a CAPM analysis and suggests that the case for the energy paradox is weaker than has previously been believed.
II. Review of the Literature
While virtually every home improvement product on the market comes with an engineering-based estimate of the potential energy savings from the use of that product, there have been relatively few studies documenting the actual returns received by individuals who pursue home improvement strategies. In a series of papers that are closest in spirit to our work, Hirst (1987) and Hirst and Goeltz (1984, 1985) evaluate the effects on energy use of the Bonneville Power Administration's interim residential weatherization program. This program performed energy audits-from 1980-1982-free to customers, and included zero-interest loans for installation of measures recommended by the audits. These researchers studied programs that focused on houses that used electricity for heating, and estimated the energy savings for customers that performed retrofits. According to their estimates, the energy savings of these programs were sufficient to cover the costs of the retrofits, which averaged $2,650 per household in their sample. Train (1985) reports hurdle-rate measures for thermal integrity of 26% and 32% based on national surveys. Sebold and Fox (1985) studied the San Diego Gas and Electric Company's audit program, and compared the realized returns by individuals to that predicted by engineering studies. They found that, on average, total returns came in somewhat below those predicted by engineering studies. A similar finding is reported in Hirst (1986) , who finds that actual savings from retrofit programs fall short of savings predicted by energy auditors by 22% to 53%. The Sebold and Fox results along with the Hirst results lend support for our hypothesis that engineering or other ''professional'' estimates of returns are biased upwards.
Our study differs from the past work both in its methodology and its focus. Rather than investigating the total return to a comprehensive, utility-sponsored project, we analyze the returns for individual projects that consumers undertake. We think that this focus is important for a number of reasons. First, participants in a utility program presumably receive careful coaching about energy use from the auditors. It may be that the energy savings that follow the investment could be received without making any energy investments. 1 Since our sample, discussed in more detail below, does not include only improvements by people involved in audits, we will be able to approximate more closely the actual savings received by typical individuals who pursue home improvement without careful coaching. Second, by focusing on individual projects, we can construct measures of the actual returns achieved in a typical home. This is an important new step, since engineering estimates provided by manufacturers of potential returns may not accurately reflect the true returns that households could expect to receive. 2 In addition to shedding light on consumer behavior, our estimation methodology may be helpful in formulating more-efficient energyconservation plans in the future.
III. Measuring the Returns to Home Improvement Investments
In this section, we present the basic model we use to estimate the energy savings experienced by households in our sample. One could measure the returns to conservation investment by regressing energy consumption on attributes of the family and the house, and dummy variables indicating investments made in energy-efficient capital. The coefficient on the investment dummy would provide a measure of the returns to the investment (in terms of energy reductions). The problem with the regression as described is that weather conditions vary dramatically across households and across time. Hence, if a house puts in a high-efficiency fuel burner and we observe a decrease in energy consumption, we cannot identify whether the conservation investment lowered fuel use or whether winter temperatures happened to moderate in the second year. One approach to this problem would be to include temperature data on the right-hand side, both alone and interacted with key variables. However, this is a somewhat ad hoc weather adjustment. Fortunately, there is an adjustment we can make that follows from energy engineering considerations. We use Normalized Annual Consumption (NAC), a measure based on a normalization approach used in the Princeton Scorekeeping Method (PRISM), developed by the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University. We begin with a brief description of the construction of this measure. 3 The demand for space heating energy (E H ) follows from engineering principles. The space-heating energy required to maintain a desired indoor temperature of T H is proportional to the difference between T H and outdoor temperature (T O ):
where measures the inherent ''tightness'' of a house. For example, a house with significant air-infiltration losses would have a higher value of . Energy heating is supplied by fuel () which is burned with efficiency and by heat loss from appliances, people, and solar gain (Q):
Both the efficiency factor and solar gain (Q) are functions of housing characteristics. For example, a house with new double-paned glass would increase Q without increasing . Equating expressions (1) and (2), fuel requirements are given by
where
and
The variable can be thought of as the desired temperature setting adjusted for natural heating from other sources (Q).
1 For example, participants may be more conscious of energy waste and may be quicker to shut doors and windows during the heating and cooling seasons. Hartman and Doane (1987) provide some evidence for this view in a study of the Portland General Electric Company's audit program, finding that consumption dropped for participants in the program.
2 Even if insulation firms are not artificially inflating estimates, this might happen if the assumptions used to generate predicted returns do not accurately reflect the properties of the capital stock that is being modified. For example, an estimate of the return to weatherstripping would also depend on the thermal integrity of the window that is being treated. (If the window were open, then the return would be zero.) When calculating an engineering return, some assumption about the thermal integrity of the treated window must be made. It may be that the characteristics of households that engage in home improvement investments differs significantly from those assumed in baseline engineering savings calculations.
3 The PRISM methodology is described in Fels (1986) .
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Since fuel consumption is restricted to be nonnegative, equation (4.1) can be rewritten as
where HDD() ϭ max(0, Ϫ T O ) is the instantaneous heating-degree day measure for the house at reference temperature . 4 Finally, if the house uses a constant amount of fuel for other purposes (lighting, washing, etc.) at rate ␦ 0 , fuel use becomes
where i indexes houses, s indexes billing periods, and t indexes years (1984, 1987, 1990 ). An error term () has also been added to the equation. Normalized annual consumption (NAC) for house i in year t (NAC it ) in any given year can then be constructed as
where HDD N () i is the amount of heating-degree days in a typical year for this house, and ␦ 0it and ␦ 1it are house-and year-specific estimates from a regression of energy consumption on heating-degree days from equation (6) . HDD N is computed as the average heating degree at base over a historical period. The use of normalized annual consumption rather than actual consumption for the dependent variable purges the energy consumption data of short-term weather fluctuations. The NAC measure in equation (7) assumes that energy is used only to heat homes. In many parts of the country, a more significant use of energy is for home cooling. An analogous derivation to the one leading to equations (6) and (7) leads to our adding a measure of cooling-degree days (CDD) to control for air conditioning:
Since housing characteristics and taste towards heating and cooling may vary widely, it is important to allow as much variation in the coefficients of equation (8) as possible. In this study, we estimate the coefficients at the individual house level, by regressing average daily consumption in month s on average heating-and cooling-degree days for the month. 5 Monthly consumption data and heating-and coolingdegree data are available for roughly 500 houses in the RECS data set in 1984 and 1990 , and for about 1,000 households in 1987. For each year, we run N regressions, where N is the number of households in our study, each on roughly 12 observations, 6 and construct house-specific estimates of ␦ 0 , ␦ 1 , and ␦ 2 in each year with which we generate estimates of NAC it , i indexing houses (i ϭ 1, . . . , N), and t indexing years (1984, 1987, and 1990 ).
Once we have calculated the NAC for each household in each year, calculating the savings from different types of home improvement investment will simply involve attempting to predict variation in the NAC using (among other things) structural characteristics of the homes we study. Since we have panel data on households, and the energy billing data for individual households both before and after home improvement investments are adopted, we should have a great deal of power to identify energy savings associated with even fairly small-scale home improvements. We thus proceed to regress consumption on characteristics of the household and the housing structure including measures of the presence of energy-conservation investments:
The vector X includes family characteristics (including number of children and household income for example), and housing characteristics (e.g., house size). It also includes a dummy variable for the presence of attic insulation, a popular investment that can be done by a handy homeowner and has the potential for substantial returns. Unlike some other investments tracked in the RECS data, it is fairly easy to measure the extent of this form of investment.
To summarize, we proceed as follows:
1) We create monthly data on temperature and energy consumption for each household in each year. 2) We estimate equation (8) for each household in each year, in order to obtain individual estimates of the ␦s. 3) We generate estimates of NAC for each household using household-and year-specific coefficients. 4) We regress NAC on energy capital as well as housing and demographic variables in order to identify the energy savings associated with specific characteristics.
IV. The Data
Our main data source is the Department of Energy's Residential Energy Conservation Survey (RECS). 7 The RECS survey is conducted in two major parts: the Household Survey and the Energy Supplier Survey. In the household survey, information concerning the structure in which the household lives and demographic information is gathered. The Energy Supplier Survey contains billing records of actual energy consumption for the surveyed households. 8 We have available to us three waves of RECS data: 1984 RECS data: , 1987 RECS data: , and 1990 . The survey is designed to collect information about households in two successive surveys. Hence, in each wave, half the households are held over from the previous survey, while half are added (to be reinterviewed in the next survey). This rotation design allows us to construct a panel of households observed in two periods. Table 1 summarizes the coverage of our sample. Each survey comprises between 5,000 and 6,000 households. However, we lose a number of households for various reasons. First, we focus on households that list its primary heating source as gas or electric. We limit ourselves to these households because monthly billing data in 1987 are available only for these households. This reduces our sample by roughly a quarter. Next, we throw out households with insufficient monthly billing data. For purposes of running the individual regressions in equation (8), we impose the restriction that there be at least twelve observations on billing data for the household-specific regression. We also eliminate households with excessively long billing periods (defined as 70 or more days in length). This reduces measurement error resulting from averaging temperature and consumption data over long time periods. 9 These restrictions reduce our sample by 44%. Finally, we consider only those households present in both years of the sample. This gives us 2,272 observations on 1,136 households.
We occasionally will restrict our sample further. First, we eliminate households with very large changes (50% change in absolute value) in the measured normalized annual consumption measure from the household-level regressions from the first year to the next. This restriction reduced the sample by 5%. While these outliers appear to result from poorly estimated first-stage regressions (NAC regressions), it is a judgment call whether to drop them or not. As we will discuss below, we find that the results are not sensitive to dropping them. We also lose households in regressions in which we enter household-specific information. Some of the variables we use in the second-round regressions are missing for some households. The largest loss is due to missing data on age of furnace equipment. This reduces the number of households by 300 (from 1,136 to 836). We also find that the type of housing unit makes a big difference in the secondround regressions. The survey looks at single-family homes, both detached and attached, housing units in large buildings (typically rental units in apartment houses), and mobile homes. Restricting analysis to single-family units reduces the sample of households to 945. Imposing all three restrictions reduces the sample from 1,136 households to 765.
V. Normalized Annual Consumption
Table 2 summarizes our estimates of the coefficients in equation (8). Recall that these are house-year specific regressions of energy consumption on heating-and coolingdegree days. Variation in these coefficient estimates reflects variation in housing structure as well as individual behavior. This variation will be reflected in variation in our measured NAC to be constructed below. Each element of the first row for each variable in the table gives the change in million BTUs per change in hundred-degree days. Standard deviations are in parentheses. For example, our mean estimate for 1984 suggests that an extra hundred heating-degree days (roughly 3 degrees colder each day for the entire month) would increase energy consumption in that month by 1.617 million BTUs. 10 There is wide dispersion in the responsiveness of energy consumption to temperature swings, however. The next two numbers-rows 3 and 4 under each variable-give the 25th and 75th percentile values for the estimates. For the 1987 data, wave 1 refers to households that entered the survey in 1984 (exiting in 1987), and wave 2 refers to households entering survey in 1987 (exiting in 1990). Focusing on 1987, it appears that the wave 1 households have slightly higher energy consumption (controlling for weather): the mean intercept for wave 1 is nearly 6% greater than the intercept for wave 2. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, however, fails to reject that the distributions of ␦ 0 , ␦ 1 , and ␦ 2 are the same across waves. 11 We next proceed to constructing estimates of normalized energy consumption (NAC). We use the coefficient estimates from equation (8) for each household in each year to predict consumption assuming ''normal'' weather conditions. Normal weather conditions are defined as average 8 An important attribute of the RECS survey is the acquisition of energy-consumption data from energy suppliers directly. This eliminates a major source of noise in the data resulting from relying on householder's recollections of past energy consumption.
9 A few households have billing periods as long as 300 or more days.
10 There are roughly 7.8 gallons of fuel oil per million BTUs. Thus, this increase in energy consumption is about 12.5 gallons of fuel oil.
11 The p-values for the test statistics are 0.94, 0.18, and 0.63, for ␦ 0 , ␦ 1 , and ␦ 2 , respectively. (2), and (3) 765
Notes: Valid monthly billing data are data for which at least twelve months of data are available and for which all billing periods are less than seventy days in length. Complete household data refers to households for which no missing data for regressors in equation (10) exist. Most missing data are for equipment age. NAC outliers are households that register a 50% or more increase or decrease in NAC between periods. See text for fuller discussion. 519 MEASURING THE ENERGY SAVINGS FROM HOME IMPROVEMENT heating-and cooling-degree days in the sample for each household. 12 Plugging these data into equation (9) yields our measure of NAC. Table 3 provides summary information on normalized annual consumption. Normalized energy consumption ranges widely in the sample, with the 75th percentile being roughly double the 25th percentile. We now proceed to the second stage of analysis.
VI. Estimating the Energy Savings of Investments
To estimate the effects of energy-conservation investments on energy consumption, we estimate a semilog regression, where the log of each individual's NAC is regressed on conservation and control characteristics. Given this specification, the coefficient on each variable is interpretable as the percent change in energy use due to a change in that variable. We begin by reporting sample statistics on the data (see table 4). Roughly 75% of the houses have attic insulation (with some adding insulation during the period of observation). Houses in the sample tend to be old (with half of them built in the 1950s or earlier) and with old heating systems. We also include information on the characteristics of the house (number of windows, area heated), heating and cooling practices (thermostat setting and use of air conditioners), as well as price information for gas and electricity. Prices are measured in cents per 1,000 BTUs.
Our basic regression is given in equation (10) above. We rewrite it as
where K is a dummy variable indicating the presence of attic insulation, and X is a vector of variables measuring characteristics of the house and the family to emphasize the role of attic insulation. The coefficient on the attic insulation variable measures the impact of insulation on energy use for ''normal'' weather conditions, conditional on other characteristics of the household and house. We will contrast the NAC 
where BTU is actual energy consumption, and W is a vector of heating-and cooling-degree days.
An important econometric issue that we address is the endogeneity of the decision to add attic insulation. One can tell two stories about the influence of endogeneity on the estimate of the coefficient on the insulation dummy. First, it may be that houses with high levels of energy consumption unexplained by other variables included in our regressions respond to the high consumption of energy by adding insulation. In this case, Cov(⑀ it , K it ) Ͼ 0 and the coefficient on the insulation dummy will be biased upward. Alternatively, it may be that energy-conscious households both consume less energy and are more likely to invest in conservation capital. In this case, Cov(⑀ it , K it ) Ͻ 0 and the coefficient on the insulation dummy will be biased downward.
The appropriate treatment of the endogeneity problem depends on one's beliefs about the source of the correlation. Decompose the error term into a time varying and a time invariant component:
( 1 1 )
An unobservable ''taste'' for energy conservation might reasonably be assumed to be time invariant, in which case the bias in OLS estimation arises from our not controlling for a household-specific fixed effect. If the correlation arises from an unobservable time-invariant variable, then we can remedy the problem by running fixed effects or firstdifference regressions. It may be, however, that the correlated component of the error term is not time invariant, in which case an alternative approach will be needed. In effect, we have a treatment correction problem where the expected value of the error term (⑀) differs across values of the treatment variable. In addition to equation (10Ј) (or 10Љ), we need an equation to explain the investment decision:
where K* is an unobserved latent variable that affects the decision to invest, and Z is a vector of variables that influence the decision to invest.
Under the assumption that ⑀ it and it are joint normal with correlation coefficient , then (omitting subscripts):
where is the standard normal density function, ⌽ the cumulative normal distribution function, ⑀ the standard deviation of ⑀, and the standard deviation of . 13 Combining equation (10Ј), (13.1), and (13.2),
where ␤ 3 equals ⑀ . We can estimate (K it ) by running a probit regression of K it on Z it and predicting (Z it ␥/ ) and ⌽(Z it ␥/ ) from that regression. Adding an estimate of derived from estimates of and ⌽ to the regression equation (10Ј) (or 10Љ) permits consistent estimation of the parameters of interest (␤ 1 and ␤ 2 ). 14 We can test for the correlation of ⑀ and the insulation variable by carrying out a Wald test on the significance of the Heckman-type correction term. This approach makes strong assumptions on the distribution of the joint-error process. An alternative approach is to run an instrumental variables regression where the predicted probability from the probit regression is used as an instrument for the attic insulation variable. 15 We can test for the correlation of ⑀ and the insulation variable by carrying out a Hausman specification test comparing the vector of coefficient estimates from the OLS and IV regressions. Table 5 provides the first results for attic insulation. We begin by discussing results for some of the nonconservation variables based on a regression on the full sample (first column). Energy consumption goes up with family size and with household income. For the latter, the dummy variable for low-income households (below $10,000) is excluded. Energy use tends to increase with income with the highest income group using 23% more energy on average than the lowest income group. Two of the price measures are statistically significant; below, we report estimates of elasticities evaluated at mean energy prices. Nonwhites tend to use greater than 6% more energy on average. All in all, the nonconservation results are quite plausible.
13 See Greene (1997) for a standard treatment of the treatment-correction problem.
14 Dubin and McFadden (1984) call this the Conditional Expectation Correction Method. 15 Alternatively, Dubin and McFadden point out that one can simply let the predicted probability from the probit regression proxy for the attic insulation variable. Our results are unaffected by the choice of IV estimator.
MEASURING THE ENERGY SAVINGS FROM HOME IMPROVEMENT
We next turn our attention to the attic insulation variable. For the full sample, the coefficient estimate on this variable has the incorrect sign (insulation associated with increased energy consumption) and is statistically insignificant. Before considering issues of endogeneity and correlations of the investment variable with the error term, we consider the importance of sample selection. We ran regressions in which we excluded households on the basis of two sampleselection criteria. First, we excluded households for which there is a very large change in NAC between samples (greater than 50% in absolute value). Excluding these observations reduces the estimated coefficient somewhat, but it is still positive and statistically insignificant. Second, we limited the analysis to single-family homes. In this case, the estimated coefficient is now negative and exceeds its standard error. That results should change so much for selection on single-family units is not very surprising. There is likely to be considerable noise in the relationship between energy conservation and consumption for trailers, multifamily units, and other attached units. If we also exclude large NAC change outliers (last column), the estimated coefficient increases slightly (Ϫ4.9%). The second column of table 5 reports results from this regression. 16 Except for the attic insulation variable, none of the other coefficient estimates change in any important way. We ran an F test for pooling the two samples and rejected pooling decisively. 17 For the remainder of the paper, we report regression results from the subsample of single-family homes with no large NAC outliers.
The regressions in table 5 do not account for possible correlation between the insulation variable and the error term. We turn next (in table 6) to several approaches with which we attempt to control for this correlation. This table reports coefficient estimates for the insulation variable only (along with some other regression statistics). The first column reports the OLS regression from the second column of table 5. In the next column, we difference the data to remove individual specific intercepts from the data. As noted above, if these intercepts (reflecting unobserved household and householder characteristics) are correlated with the insulation variable, then the coefficient estimate will be biased. 18 Regardless of how we limit the sample, the firstdifference coefficient estimates are lower than in the OLS regressions. In all cases, they are now negative and quite large relative to their standard errors. For the restricted subsample, the coefficient estimate falls (from Ϫ0.049 to Ϫ0.045) and has a two-sided p value of 3.6%. A Hausman specification test fails to reject the null hypothesis of uncorrelated fixed effects. The test statistic equals 0.3 and has a p-value of 58%. 19 The results in column 2 suggest that controlling for house-specific intercepts has a modest but statistically insignificant impact on the coefficient estimates. 20 16 Complete regression results for the restricted sample regression are reported in appendix A. 17 The test statistic equals 3.34 and is distributed as an F-statistic with 217 and 1,625 degrees of freedom.
18 The first-difference regression coefficient on attic insulation is identified by changes over time within households in insulation quantities. 19 This test follows the approach of Dubin and McFadden (1984) in testing for parameter differences in the insulation variable only. We reject the null hypothesis if we construct the test on the basis of the entire coefficient vector. We view this as too restrictive a test, however, for the purposes of this paper and its focus on the returns to energy conservation. 20 We also ran a first-difference regression in which all time-varying variables (other than attic insulation) are excluded from the regression. In 
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Note that the conjectured bias from unobserved time invarying ''taste'' for conservation should be in a downward direction. The OLS bias detected by the first-difference regression is positive and suggests that our first bias story is the correct one. That story does not necessarily follow from an unobserved time-invariant component and so suggests the value of trying other estimation approaches. The next two columns provide results where we control for the correlation resulting from the fact that attic insulation is potentially endogenous. We report results for a treatmentcorrection model and an instrumental variables model. Both the treatment correction and the IV approach require us to run an auxillary regression of our attic insulation variable on instrumental variables. We use two sets of instruments. The first set includes education dummies indicating the level of education for the head of household. These instruments are motivated by the belief that education is likely to affect the decision to invest in conservation capital but is less likely to affect energy consumption itself (after controlling for household income). The second instrument set includes information about housing tenure and includes information on whether the family moved into the house prior to 1974 and whether they've moved in within the past five years. If householders moved into their house prior to 1974, they may have increased their attic insulation after the first oil shock in late 1973. Therefore, they may be less likely to put in additional insulation during our sample period. Also, one would expect householders to carry out large-scale home improvement projects at the time (or soon after the time) when they move into a new house. None of these variables should be correlated with the error term in the energyconsumption regression.
Before discussing the results, we point out that the first-stage regression results support our conjectures about the investment decision. People who moved into their current house after 1974 are slightly more likely to have attic insulation, although neither the effect nor its t-statistic are very large. However, householders who moved in less than five years ago are less likely to have attic insulation (coefficient estimate is Ϫ0.07 with a t-statistic of 3.1). Finally, education variables suggest that more education is associated with having insulation in the attic although only the dummy variable for high-school graduates is statistically significant (relative to high-school dropouts). The equation fits the data fairly well with the probit regression correctly predicting the presence of attic insulation 89% of the time.
The instrumental variable (IV) model results are in the third column of Table 6 . 21 The estimated coefficient falls from Ϫ4.5% (column 2) to Ϫ2.3%; however the standard error of the coefficient estimate is quite large. Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between errors in the treatment regression and the energy-consumption regression. The last column reports results from the treatment-correction regression. Now the point estimate rises to Ϫ8.1% but again is imprecisely estimated, and it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that there were no energy savings resulting from insulation. Again, we cannot reject the hypothesis of zero correlation between errors in the treatment regression and the energy-consumption regression: the test statistic equals 0.09 and has a p-value of 76%. Except for the treatment-correction regression, the IV regressions typically generate coefficient estimates that are less negative than the OLS estimates. The general pattern of smaller (in absolute value) estimated coefficients in the first-difference and IV regressions suggest that energyconscious households both consume less energy and are more likely to invest in conservation capital. We are unable to conclude, however, on statistical grounds that we can reject zero correlation between the error term and the insulation variable that leads to biased estimates of its coefficient parameter.
In all of our regressions, we pooled data from households that use gas and electric heating. Lee and Singh (1994) have estimated patterns in residential gas and electricity consumption and investigated whether is it appropriate to pool gas and electric customers. Like us, they find that selectivity is of little import. But they do find that it is not appropriate to pool gas and electric customers. Given the results in Lee and Singh, we investigate whether splitting gas and electric customers is important in our analysis. 22 Table 7 reports NAC regression results for households that heat with natural gas. 23 The coefficient estimate from the OLS regression is slightly higher for the natural gas subsample, while it is slightly lower in the first-difference regression. If we can ignore the possibility of bias resulting from endogenous capital choices, we can simply run a Chow test in the OLS regressions to test for coefficient stability across the two subsamples. Given the results from the Wald and Hausman tests in table 6, we see no reason to conclude that bias in the OLS regressions is significant. With this as a working assumption, we construct pooling tests in which we compare the full sample to the natural gas subsample. For the OLS regression, our test statistic equals 1.54, and we reject pooling the two heating-source samples. For the firstdifference regression, however, we fail to reject. Thus, there is some evidence in our sample that indicates pooling may be inappropriate. However, we note that the impact of pooling on the variable of interest is negligible. Even in the OLS regression, it would be impossible to reject constancy all cases, the coefficient estimate becomes larger (in absolute value) than the first-difference regressions with controls. These results suggest the importance of controlling for as much house-and family-specific variation as possible in the data. 21 This IV regression is a two-stage least squares regression. We also ran regressions in which we simply used the predicted probability as a proxy for the attic insulation variable in the regression. Results were very similar to those reported here.
of the insulation coefficient across the two samples, and, in various regressions that we ran (including IV and treatmentcorrection regressions), the coefficient estimates from the natural gas sample could be larger or smaller than the estimate from the full sample. In no case, however, did we find a large (in absolute value) statistically significant coefficient estimate on the attic insulation variable from the natural-gas sample. We conclude from this that pooling or not pooling has little impact on our coefficient of interest.
As a check of how sensitive our results are to the NAC procedure, we next present alternative measures of the impact of attic insulation on energy consumption (table 8) . Rather than constructing a measure of normalized energy consumption, we use actual (or unnormalized) energy consumption (BTU) and add heating-and cooling-degree day measures on the right-hand side. 24 The impact of insulation is Ϫ9.1% for the OLS regression and is statistically significant at the 99% level. The impact in the first-difference regression is smaller (Ϫ4.7%) and just misses being significant at the 95% level. 25 Other coefficient estimates from the regression on actual consumption are quite similar to corresponding estimates from the NAC regression (compare   column 2 of table 5 to column 1 of table 8 ) and the fit of the NAC regression (as measured by the R 2 ).
The closeness of the coefficient estimates in the firstdifference regressions when ln (NAC) is the dependent variable and when ln (BTU) is the dependent variable gives us some confidence that the more scientifically valid NAC approach does not impose structure on the data that biases our conclusions. It is true that the OLS impact in the latter regression is larger, and we will return to this issue when we convert this point estimate of energy savings into a percentage investment return. Before doing this, we consider other information contained in the regression findings, in particular estimates of price elasticities of demand.
VII. Estimates of Price Elasticity of Demand
We next turn to estimates of the price elasticity of demand generated from our micro data. Recall that we have three price variables. Our first price is a price for electricity for households whose main heating source is electricity, our second price is a price for natural gas for households whose main heating source is gas, and our third price is a price for electricity for those latter households. These prices are generated by dividing total expenditure for each fuel type by BTU consumption. Hence, these are average prices and elasticity estimates will be biased if there are significant differences between the marginal and average price of Notes: Partial listing of estimated coefficients from a regression of ln (NAC) on household characteristics and conservation capital (equation (10Ј)) from subsample of households heating with natural gas. White standard errors are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 95% level. ** Significant at 99% level. 
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energy. To the extent, however, that households make consumption decisions based on the size of their energy bill rather than the marginal price, then these elasticity estimates will measure the correct responsiveness of consumers to changes in energy prices. 26 The first row of table 9 gives the estimate of the price elasticity of electricity for households who heat with electricity (roughly 25% of the sample). For the normalized energy-consumption regressions, our estimate of the price elasticity of demand for electricity for this group is Ϫ1.11 for the OLS and IV regressions, and Ϫ0.27 for the firstdifference regressions. In general, the elasticity estimates are quite precisely estimated in the OLS and IV regressions, but are imprecisely estimated in the first-difference regressions. Price elasticity estimates drop in the BTU regressions to Ϫ0.78 and Ϫ0.01, respectively. Our estimates of the price elasticity of demand for electricity for households that heat with gas are substantially lower (row 2) and, in some cases, positive. A recent study on the demand for residential electricity (Branch, 1993) cites a number of studies in which the estimated price elasticity of demand ranges from Ϫ0.11 to Ϫ0.55. Our estimates are disaggregated by heating source and strictly speaking are not comparable to the estimated elasticities reported in Branch. The third row in table 9 reports a weighted elasticity of demand for electricity where the two elasticity estimates from rows 1 and 2 are weighted by the number of observations in each group. The weighted elasticity estimates from our NAC regression are more comparable to those reported in Branch and lie in the range of estimates he reports. The weighted elasticity estimates from the BTU regressions, however, fall substantially below the lower bound of estimates reported by Branch, because of the positive (and statistically significant) estimate for gas households.
Finally, the last row reports price elasticities for natural gas. These elasticities are uniformly lower than the elasticities for electric heating (row 1) for the NAC regressions. Herbert and Kreil (1989) report results from which a price elasticity of demand for natural gas can be computed which is equal to Ϫ0.36. Houthakker and Taylor (1970) report a short-run price elasticity for natural gas of Ϫ0.15. Our OLS estimate from the NAC regression is Ϫ0.48. The firstdifference regression is much smaller (Ϫ0.08) but is imprecisely estimated. The elasticity estimates from the BTU regressions are higher and appreciably above the estimates reported by Herbert and Kreil or Houthakker and Taylor (OLS and IV regressions) . In general, we view these results as supportive of the NAC methodology.
VIII. Returns to Conservation
We next turn to converting the energy-savings estimates in the regressions to dollar savings to estimate a measure of the economic return to conservation. To do this, we must make assumptions about the future path of energy prices and obtain an estimate of the costs of attic insulation. Given assumptions about the future path of energy prices, we can compute the internal rate of return on the conservation investment. Let K be the cost of the investment, measured in our data by the price of insulation times the square footage of the attic, and C be current energy cost savings C ϭ ␤ pE, where p is the price of energy and E is consumption in BTUs or some other unit of energy use, and ␤ is the estimated regression coefficient for making the investment. Our preferred point estimate for ␤ is Ϫ0.049 from the OLS regression in table 6. We also provide results using a low estimate of ␤ (␤ equals Ϫ0.023 from the IV regression in table 6) and a high estimate of ␤ (␤ equals Ϫ0.091 from the OLS regression on actual consumption in table 8).
Under the assumption that energy prices grow at a fixed rate, ␥, and that energy consumption is constant, we can compute the internal rate of return () by solving the following equation:
If the returns continue forever (T ϭ ϱ) and Ͼ ␥, then the internal rate of return is given by
26 Wilder and Willenborg (1975) and Shin (1985) present evidence that consumers respond to average price rather than to marginal price. (10Ј) and (10Љ)). The columns labeled ''NAC'' refer to regressions with normalized annual consumption as the dependent variable while those labeled ''BTU'' refer to regressions with actual consumption as the dependent variable. Row 1 reports the price elasticity of demand for electricity for households who heat with electricity. The next row reports the price elasticity of demand for electricity for households who heat with natural gas. The third row reports a weighted price elasticity of demand for electricity based on responsiveness of households using electricity for space heating and households using natural gas for space heating. The last row reports the price elasticity of demand for natural gas for households who heat with natural gas. See text for more details. * Significant at 95% level. ** Significant at 99% level.
MEASURING THE ENERGY SAVINGS FROM HOME IMPROVEMENT
The mean ratio of energy cost savings to costs of attic insulation (C/K) for households that make investments in our sample is 11.0%, and the median is 9.7%. If consumers assume that current energy prices will not change in the future (␥ ϭ 0), then the median return on this investment is 9.7%. A return in this range is not particularly large and suggests that the engineering estimates, which for this product can easily exceed 50%, overestimate the returns to conservation. 27 The return is higher (lower) if energy prices are expected to increase (fall) in the future. Table 10 presents some estimates of the return on attic insulation for different values of C/K and the growth rate of energy prices. Using the mean estimate of the current return (C/K) and assuming no growth in energy prices, then the discount rate implied by the data is bounded above by 11.0%. Table 10 also presents a range of estimates based on different assumptions in the growth rate of energy prices and the mean current return. Using our preferred estimate of ␤, the estimated return ranges from nearly 8% to just over 14%. The lowest estimated discount rate implied by the returns in table 10 is 2%, while the highest is 25%. This highest estimate begins to lend credence to the existence of the energy paradox; however, this estimate requires a fairly high current return (nearly 22% per year) plus a 3% real growth in energy prices. Note, also, that the mean return (11.0%) is from a highly skewed distribution of returns in our sample. Figure 1 shows the distribution of returns in our sample among those households that actually invested in attic insulation. The vertical line is drawn at the mean return. Over 75% of the households in the sample have a return less than 13.5%. Thus, while table 10 suggests the possibility of the energy paradox using a high estimate of ␤ and a high estimate of real energy-price growth rates, the distribution of returns in our sample suggest that, for the bulk of investors, the realized return is far below that required for the existence of an energy paradox.
A more-complete comparison of the realized returns from this study and underlying discount rates must control for the risk of the investment. We can think of the investment as a project and calculate the project beta from which we can compute the risk-adjusted discount rate. The return on this investment is based on energy savings (fuel oil, natural gas, and electricity). The beta for crude petroleum and natural gas is on the order of 1.1 and for electric utilities of 0.5. 28 Given the fraction of houses that heat with natural gas and with electricity in our data set, these values of beta would suggest a project beta of roughly 1 for our sample. A beta of 1 means that the project discount rate should match the market return, a number on the order of 10% during our sample period. 29 If this is correct, then we have shown that there is essentially no energy paradox for this investment. 30 Before concluding that there is no energy paradox, we should last check whether the households that invest receive a greater return than do those that do not invest. If not, one might conclude that there is still the possibility of an energy paradox since the noninvestors are passing up an investment that has a return higher than the appropriate hurdle rate. We cannot measure the return for those households that do not invest. But we can look at attributes of the household that might correlate with the return. Means for these variables broken down between investors and noninvestors are presented in table 11. First, we report statistics for the age of house. Older houses are expected to benefit more from insulation while newer houses are more likely to be well insulated upon construction. The test statistics bear this out. Houses for which investments are not made tend to be newer. Roughly 50% of the houses in which investments are not made were built since 1960, while roughly 50% of the houses in which investments are made were built prior to 1950. Second, we look at energy consumption (using the normalized energy-consumption measure). Houses with large amounts of energy consumption will benefit more from investment, as a 5% energy reduction will mean greater 27 See Blasnik (1990) for an example of such calculations. 28 Brealey and Myers report an industry beta of 1.07 for crude petroleum and natural gas and 0.46 for electric utilities (1984, table 9-3, p. 173) .
29 Kocherlakota (1996) reports a real return on the S&P500 of 7%. Feldstein et al. (1983) report a pretax real rate of return on capital for the postwar period of 12%. On an after-corporate tax basis, this would produce a return around 9% to 10%. 30 This ignores the irreversible nature of the investment. Incorporating this would push the hurdle rate up even higher. (See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a full treatment of this concept.) 
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reductions on their energy bill. The mean energy consumption for investors is over 10% higher than for noninvestors. The test statistic for equality of means for energy consumption equals 2.0, suggesting that we can reject the hypothesis of equal means for investors and noninvestors. Finally, we report statistics on the mean price of the main heating fuel for houses (per 1,000 BTUs). Again, the return to the investment will be greater at higher energy prices. The results are less conclusive here. For households heating with electricity, the mean price for investors is slightly higher, but we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean prices are the same across the two groups. For households heating with gas, the price of gas for noninvestors is slightly higher but the difference is economically negligible. We also considered other variables that one might believe are correlated with the decision to invest but which are not directly related to the return that households receive from conservation investment. Mean income, education levels, and age of main householder all show no statistically significant differences between investors and noninvestors. Since these variables don't affect the return on the investment, we would not expect to find significant differences.
Finally, we investigated whether households turn up their thermostats after adding insulation. If there were such a ''rebound'' effect, then energy-consumption reductions would understate the benefits of the improvement, although our runs controlled for this in a linear fashion through the inclusion of the thermostat setting in the set of control variables. There was no evidence of a significant rebound effect. For single family homes, for example, the difference between the change in thermostat settings for those who added new attic insulation and those who didn't was 0.24 deg., which was not statistically distinguishable from zero (the t-statistic is 0.53).
Summing up, our results lend support to the hypothesis that there is no energy paradox. Mean returns for investors is not significantly greater than one would expect from a CAPM analysis of the energy-conservation decision, and differences between investors and noninvestors suggest that noninvestors would not have received higher returns had they invested than did those households that did invest.
IX. Conclusion
We combine monthly energy billing data with the annual Residential Energy Conservation Survey (RECS) in order to assess the energy savings from home improvement investments. We use the panel features of our data to control for individual and structure-specific heterogeneity, and find that this step importantly affects our inferences. We find that the data-which may well be the most comprehensive yet applied to this question-provide little evidence of an energy paradox. The median rate of return in this analysis for attic insulation is 9.7%. These rates put an upper bound on the implied discount rate for the energy investments analyzed in this paper and are consistent with plausible discount rates suggested by a CAPM analysis. These rates are substantially below engineering estimates that frequently indicate that the returns can be 50% or higher. In closing, we feel it is important to note that these results do not necessarily imply that subsidies for home improvement activity are bad policy. Even if consumers rationally account for all factors that directly affect their purchase of home improvement technologies, they might not account for the possible social costs of higher pollution associated with their energy-consumption choices. 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

